In a laboratory task similar to an X-ray baggage search at an airport, Wolfe, Horowitz, and Kenner (2005) reported a ''prevalence effect" (i.e., a very high miss rate) when the presence of a target is very infrequent. The present study tested whether this prevalence effect is the result of a voluntary top-down control for future prospect or an implicit bottom-up priming from past experience. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that, regardless of instructions given on the likelihood of target presence, the magnitude of prevalence (i.e., the miss rate) was determined only by the actual prevalence of the target. In Experiments 3 and 4, target prevalence was indicated by background color on a trial-by-trial basis. Some blocks (i.e., constant blocks) were either comprised of all high-prevalence trials or all low-prevalence trials, whereas in other blocks (i.e., mixed blocks) high-prevalence and low-prevalence trials were randomly mixed. Target prevalence significantly affected the miss rate in the constant blocks, but had no effect in the mixed blocks. Overall, the prevalence effect is essentially the result of past experience and is not affected by future prospect.
Introduction
In daily life, human observers constantly perform visual searches: for instance, we may search for a friend in a crowded shopping mall or look for our favorite brand of chocolate bar on the shelves in a supermarket. Sometimes, visual searches have substantial social importance; failing to find desired targets could be disastrous. Nevertheless, such failures seem to be rather unavoidable when the targets appear very rarely (i.e., a ''prevalence effect"). The prevalence effect has been studied since Kundel (1982) (see also Gur et al., 2003) and has recently been popularized by Wolfe Horowitz, and Kenner (2005) . This popularization has triggered a considerable amount of research interest in the field (e.g., Fleck & Mitroff, 2007; Navalpakkam, Koch, & Perona, 2009 ).
The prevalence effect
Wolfe and colleagues ' (2005) experimental design was analogous to X-ray baggage searches for dangerous items at airports. They found that the prevalence effect reported by radiologists could be generalized into some real-life situations; when the percentage of target-present trials is very low in one condition (e.g., one target out of 100 trials), the miss rate becomes remarkably high (see also Gur et al., 2003) .
The basic finding of Wolfe et al. (2005) has been widely replicated (e.g., Fleck & Mitroff, 2007; Rich et al., 2008) . Nevertheless, there have been active debates on the nature of this effect. Fleck and Mitroff (2007) , for example, argued that the source of the prevalence effect could be largely attributed to motor error. In their study, when observers pressed the same key again and again for target-absent trials in the low-prevalence blocks, they tended to press the same key ''prepotently" (i.e., too fast) even if, perceptually speaking, they could see the target. To demonstrate this, Fleck and Mitroff (2007) showed that if the observers were given opportunities to correct their responses, their miss rates were dramatically reduced (i.e., the observers could correct most of their ''miss" trials). Later studies have followed this line of argument (Rich et al., 2008; Van Wert, Horowitz, & Wolfe, 2009) , and the general finding was that, even if motor responses contribute significantly to the prevalence effect, there is still a robust perceptual effect if the task difficulty is high.
Top-down control and bottom-up priming in visual search
The present study asks one further question of the prevalence effect: is the prevalence effect due to voluntary top-down control for future prospect or bottom-up priming of past experience? In the current study, what we term top-down control refers to an effect produced by knowledge about what will happen next. It is sometimes referred to as the ''expectation effect" and is often assumed to be voluntary. On the other hand, the bottom-up priming effect is produced by the sharing of some properties between the currently presented stimuli and the preceding stimuli; it is sometimes called the ''repetition effect" and is often assumed to be automatic.
0042-6989/$ -see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.visres.2010.04.020 Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994) were among the first to explicitly distinguish between the effect of top-down control and the bottom-up priming in a relevant field (see also Huang & Pashler, 2005; Kristjánsson, Wang, & Nakayama, 2002) . In their study, the repetition and expectation effects of target color were examined. They defined top-down control as the observers' expectation of the target color being present in the upcoming trial and manipulated bottom-up priming by repeating the target color of the previous trial(s). In their experiments, observers searched for one of the possible color singleton targets (e.g., red or green) in a particular trial; for example, if a target was red in trial N, then in trial N + 1, a red target was ''repeated" whereas a green target was not. However, expectation also depends on the experimental settings: in Maljkovic and Nakayama's (1994) study, the color of targets varied randomly from trial to trial in some of the blocks, and so the observers had no reliable expectations regarding the target color of trial N + 1; in other blocks, the target color in the trials almost always alternated from one trial to the next, and so when the target was red in trial N, the observers would expect the next trial to be green, not red. Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994) found an exclusive role of bottom-up repetition, but no role of top-down expectation: response time was significantly shorter if the target color was repeated, compared to when it was not, and this difference was not affected by the expectation of the observers.
These two effects (i.e., repetition vs. expectation) are logically orthogonal, but they could be easily confounded as they tend to happen together in situations such as a long sequence of repetitions. For example, Kristjánsson and colleagues (2002) asked observers to perform conjunction searches for two types of potential targets (a search for a red-vertical or a green-horizontal target among a distractor array of red-horizontal and green-vertical items). The observers performed better when the type of targets remained the same throughout the whole block (i.e., a constant block) rather than varying randomly (i.e., a random block). What is particularly interesting is that a few accidental repetitions within a random block (i.e., experience) made the observers' performance in this block almost as good as that in a constant block, even if there was no reason to predict that the repetition would continue (i.e., prospect). Clearly, experience, not prospect, determines the performance, even if it had usually been attributed to expectation.
The experiments of Wolfe et al. (2005) could not distinguish between top-down control for future prospect and bottom-up priming of past experience. In each target-present trial in their experiments, the targets were rare in the past and were expected to be rare in the future. Therefore, the observers could have missed the rare targets either because they knew that the targets were going to be rare or because, from their past experience, the targets had been rare.
How could we distinguish between these two possibilities? We deliberately created situations in which past experience is different from future prospect (e.g., the target has been frequent in the past, but is known to be rare in the future). By exploiting such situations, we can determine whether the prevalence effect is the result of past experience or future prospect: if the prevalence effect occurs whenever the future prospect of the target is ''rare", then, regardless of past experience, we know that the prevalence effect is the result of future prospect; on the other hand, if the prevalence effect occurs whenever, in the past experience, the target is ''rare", then, regardless of future prospect, we know that the prevalence effect is the result of past experience.
Experiments 1 and 2
In Experiments 1 and 2, we tested the effect of past experience and future prospect by giving the participants different instructions in different blocks. However, regardless of the instructions given, the frequency of the targets actually remained the same. If the prevalence effect is determined by past experience and not future prospect, then, regardless of the different instructions, we would expect the magnitude of the prevalence effect to be identical. On the other hand, if the prevalence effect is determined by future prospect and not past experience, then we would expect higher miss rates (i.e., stronger prevalence effects) when the instructions suggest a lower target presence frequency.
One important methodological difference between the present study and the one by Wolfe et al. (2005) is that we employed ''random mapping" for the response keys from trial to trial; for example, the observers had to press ''A" for target-presence and ''L" for target-absence in one trial, and then had to switch the mapping rule for the next trial (i.e., ''L" ? target-presence; ''A" ? target-absence). This procedure was included to prevent the priming of motor responses, which was the confound discussed by Fleck and Mitroff (2007) . Thus, the measured prevalence effect was more of a purely perceptual effect rather than an effect caused by making prepotent responses.
Methods

Observers
A total of 40 observers participated in the two experiments. They were undergraduate students from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, all of whom reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli
Each stimulus display was generated from high resolution grayscale JPEG pictures (rescaled to 120 Â 120 pixels). These pictures comprised six different categories of items: toys, fruits, clothing, birds, and tools. Each category contained six items. The picture choices were identical to the study by Wolfe et al. (2005) . The targets were the tool category items, while all of the other pictures served as distractors.
Each trial contained 18 to-be-searched items. In the target-absent trials, 18 distractors were drawn from the 24-item distractor pool without repetition; in the target-present trials, 17 items were drawn from the distractor set and one item was drawn among the six tool target items. All of the items were presented with a transparency level of 20%. They could overlap with each other and were presented in a random orientation within ±30°measured from the center of individual pictures.
Surrounding the stimuli display was either a red or green frame, which served as a cue for high and low target prevalence, respectively. The observers were specifically told that: (1) when the frame was red, targets would be likely to appear and (2) when the frame was green, targets would be rare. They were not informed about the actual target prevalence in each condition.
The letters ''Y" and ''N" appeared in the bottom-left and bottomright corners of the screen to indicate the observers' choice of decisions. When ''Y" was on the left and ''N" was on the right, the observers pressed ''A" for target-presence and ''L" for target-absence. The key mapping could be reversed: when ''Y" was on the right and ''N" was on the left, the observers pressed ''A" for target-absence and ''L" for target-presence. This response mapping rule varied randomly from trial to trial.
The testing environment was programmed using JAVA programming language. At a viewing distance of about 60 cm, each item subtended a visual angle of 3.34°Â 3.34°. The stimuli display measured 16.5°Â 16.5°, and the frame had a width of 0.43°. Fig. 1a  and b shows examples of the target-present and target-absent displays.
Procedure
Each trial began with a fixation cross, which was presented on the screen for one second. Then, all of the items appeared simultaneously with the colored-frame cue and the response key instructions (i.e., ''Y" & ''N"). The display remained on the screen until the observer responded by pressing either ''A" or ''L".
First, the observers completed 20 practice trials in order to become familiar with the tasks. These trials were followed by eight blocks (80 trials each) that alternated between the high-prevalence and the lowprevalence conditions. For Blocks 1-2, the frequencies were as instructed (i.e., green ? 10%; red ? 50%). For the next six blocks (i.e., Blocks 3-8), the prevalence level remained constant and was not affected by the cues provided; in other words, the observers were misinformed in three of these six blocks. Regardless of the instructions given: (1) in Experiment 1, Blocks 3-8 always had low target prevalence (i.e., 10%); and (2) in Experiment 2, Blocks 3-8 always had high target prevalence (i.e., 50%). Observers were given feedback on their performance on the practice trials, but not the test blocks.
Results
Miss error rates
All error rates data were arcsine transformed in order to stabilize the variances. In both experiments, Blocks 1 and 2 were conducted with valid instructions. These blocks served as an examination of whether our method would produce a typical low prevalence effect. They were analyzed together across Experiments 1 and 2 because the two experiments were identical in these blocks. There is clear evidence that our method produced a typical low prevalence effect (High prevalence: M = 12%; SD = 7%; Low prevalence: M = 22%; SD = 19.3%); t(39) = 3.75; p < 0.002.
Only the data from Blocks 3-8 were further analyzed. Fig. 2 presents the miss rates. The miss rates were significantly lower in Experiment 2 (with all high-prevalence blocks) than in Experiment 1, F(1, 38) = 24.69; p < 0.001. When the instructions suggested a lower frequency, these rates were slightly higher in Experiment 2 but slightly lower in Experiment 1. Importantly, neither the main effect of instruction, F(1, 38) = 0.54; p = 0.46 nor the interaction between experiment and instruction were significant, F(1, 38) = 0.67; p = 0.42. Thus, the miss rates within the same experiments were roughly identical regardless of the instructions given, but were sensitive to the true target prevalence.
Reaction times
Only correct response trials were analyzed, and outliers (i.e., beyond three standard deviations for each individual observer) were excluded from the analysis. For target-present trials, there were no statistically reliable differences between high-and low-prevalence cue trials in either Experiment 1 (Red cue: 1902 ms; Green cue: 1921 ms, t(19) = À0.198) or Experiment 2 (Red cue: 1570 ms; Green cue: 1548 ms, t(19) = 0.715). In target-absent trials, when the instructions suggested a higher target prevalence, the observers were significantly slower to respond in both Experiments 1 (Red cue: 3125 ms; Green cue: 2603 ms, t(19) = 3.76; p < 0.002) and 2 (Red cue: 3625 ms; Green cue: 3309 ms, t(19) = 2.21; p < 0.05). The data clearly suggests that when the observers were instructed to expect a higher target prevalence, they searched for a longer time before deciding that a display contained no target. In other words, the observers were actively following the instructions.
Discussion
To sum up, in both Experiments 1 and 2, the miss error rates reveal no difference in terms of the instruction (i.e., different future prospects). On the other hand, there was a very large difference in the error rate data between Experiments 1 and 2 that supported the past experience account. In short, the prevalence effect was . Results (miss rates) of Experiments 1 and 2. Target prevalence was uniformly low across all of the test blocks in Experiment 1, but was high in Experiment 2. In both experiments, participants were told that the targets would be frequent in half of the blocks and rare in the remaining blocks. The above graph shows that the miss error rate depended not on the instructions given but on the overall true target prevalence of the blocks. The error bars denote the standard errors of the miss errors across observers within the same condition. The frame on the computer monitor was green, indicating that this was a ''lowprevalence" trial. The response key mapping changed randomly from trial to trial, and observers had to refer to the positions of the Y and N characters in each of the trials to make an appropriate response.
determined completely by past experience, and not by future prospect. One may potentially question this conclusion by suggesting that the absence of an ''instruction effect" was caused by the invalidity of the instructions and that a valid instruction would significantly affect the prevalence effect. In other words, the observers quickly realized that our instructions were misleading and therefore they voluntarily stopped relying on them. This seems unlikely because when observers were instructed to expect a higher target prevalence, they took longer to decide that a display contained no target; therefore, they were actively following the instructions. Experiments 3 and 4 tested the question using a more rigorous approach.
Experiments 3 and 4
In Experiments 3 and 4, we tested the effect of past experience and future prospect by giving the observers different instructions in different trials. There were two main differences between these experiments and Experiments 1 and 2. First, the instructions were always valid: if the instruction indicated that the prevalence of target would be 10%, then it was indeed 10%. Second, the instructions could now vary between the trial levels. Some blocks (constant blocks) contained trials of the same target prevalence throughout the whole block, whereas other blocks (mixed blocks) contained a mixture of trials with two prevalence levels.
To be more precise, in Experiments 3 and 4: (1) in a ''constant high-prevalence" block, the target prevalence in the past was 50% and the target was always expected to be present 50% of the time; (2) in a ''constant low-prevalence" block, the target prevalence in the past was 10% and the target was always expected to be present 10% of the time; and (3) in a ''mixed" block, the target prevalence in the past was 30% (i.e., the average of high and low prevalence), but the expectation of target prevalence for individual trial was either 50% or 10%, depending on the cue presented in the frame. Naturally, it was expected that the observers would miss fewer targets in a ''constant high-prevalence" block than in a ''constant lowprevalence" block. However, we believed that the ''mixed" block could reveal more interesting information: if the prevalence effect depends on future prospect, then we would expect a comparable difference between trials in which high prevalence is predicted and those in which low prevalence is predicted. On the other hand, if the prevalence effect depends on past experience, then we would expect no such difference.
The only difference between Experiments 3 and 4 was the levels of task difficulty (see below). We varied the levels of difficulty to see whether the observers behaved in a similar fashion.
Methods
Observers
There were, respectively, 35 and 31 observers in Experiments 3 and 4. The data of one observer from Experiment 4 were abandoned altogether because the observer was obviously not following the instructions (i.e., overall performance close to the chance level).
Stimuli
The stimuli used were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. However, in Experiment 3, the stimuli items did not overlap with each other and they were always presented in a fixed orientation (i.e., 0°) (see Fig. 3 for a sample display). These changes were made to reduce the task difficulty in order to test whether the same results would be obtained when the task difficulty varied.
Procedure
In Experiments 3 and 4, the procedure was the same as in Experiments 1and 2 except that there were two types of blocks: (1) constant blocks, in which the cue (i.e., the color of the frame) remained the same for the whole block; and (2) mixed blocks, in which the cue (i.e., color of the frame) varied randomly from trial to trial. The meanings of the cues were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2, and, unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, the cues were always valid. The constant blocks were further divided into ''constant high-prevalence" blocks and ''constant low-prevalence" blocks. The blocks alternated between these different types. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across the observers.
Results
Error rates
We submitted the miss error rates to a mixed ANOVA design for statistical analysis. Experiments 3 and 4 only differed in terms of level of difficulty, and this factor yielded a significant main effect, F(1, 63) = 27.58; p < 0.001. Comparing the two experiments, the observers made more miss errors when the level of difficulty increased. Given that the to-be-searched items could be overlapping each other in Experiment 4 but not in Experiment 3, this is not particular surprising.
As the level of difficulty factor did not interact with the other variables (all ps > 0.08), we collapsed this factor over the other variables in subsequent analysis. In Experiments 3 and 4, the miss rate in the constant high-prevalence blocks was significantly lower The frame on the computer monitor was green, indicating that this was a ''lowprevalence" trial.
than that in the constant low-prevalence blocks, t(64) = 5.86; p < 0.001. However, within the mixed blocks, the miss rate in the high-prevalence trials was roughly identical to that in the lowprevalence trials, t(64) = 1.56; p = 0.13. The interaction between block condition (i.e., constant vs. mixed) and prevalence (i.e., high vs. low) was significant, F(1, 63) = 11.42; p = 0.002. Fig. 4 shows the miss rates of the four conditions in Experiments 3 and 4. The usual prevalence effect disappeared when the past experience were identical, even if the future prospect was very different. In sum, the results of Experiments 3 and 4 confirmed that the prevalence effect depends on past experience, not future prospect.
Reaction times
Only correct response trials were analyzed, and outliers (i.e., beyond three standard deviations for each individual observer) were excluded from the analysis. For target-present trials, there were no statistically reliable differences between high-and low-prevalence cue trials in either Experiment 3 (Mixed: Red cue, 1137 ms vs. Green cue, 1149 ms, t(34) = À0.631; Constant: Red cue, 1116 ms vs. Green cue, 1188 ms, t(34) = À1.937) or Experiment 4 (Mixed: Red cue, 1661 ms vs. Green cue, 1723 ms, t(29) = À1.170; Constant: Red cue, 1620 ms vs. Green cue, 1681 ms, t(29) = À0.734). For target-absent trials, when a higher target prevalence was suggested in the instructions, observers were significantly (or nearly significantly) slower to respond in both Experiments 3 (Mixed: Red cue, 1693 ms vs. Green cue, 1647 ms, t(34) = 3.59; p < 0.002; Constant: Red cue, 1772 ms vs. Green cue, 1625 ms, t(34) = 1.86; p < 0.1) and 4 (Mixed: Red cue, 3486 ms vs. Green cue, 3185 ms, t(29) = 6.06; p < 0.001; Constant: Red cue, 3377 ms vs. Green cue, 2827 ms, t(29) = 3.71; p < 0.002). The data clearly suggests that when the observers were instructed to expect a higher target prevalence, they took longer to decide that a display contained no target. In other words, the observers were actively following the instructions.
General discussion
In our four experiments, we showed that the prevalence effect, as reported by Wolfe et al. (2005) , depends on past experience, not future prospect. This furthered our understanding of this phenomenon and could potentially help to reveal its nature.
One important debate regarding the nature of the prevalence effect is whether it genuinely affects perception (Wolfe et al., 2005) or simply reflects a tendency to respond too early (Fleck & Mitroff, 2007) . In all of our experiments, we randomized the response keys, thus making sure that the observers did not press any one of the response keys more often than the others. Nonetheless, the observers still made more miss errors when the target prevalence was low. This finding is in agreement with the report by Van Wert et al. (2009) which stated that allowing observers to correct their decisions does not extinguish the low prevalence effect.
The present study also sheds light on the broader question as to whether the prevalence effect is a stubborn tendency of the visual search mechanism (Navalpakkam et al., 2009; Wolfe et al., 2007) or whether it can be easily influenced or ''cured" by various types of manipulation (Fleck & Mitroff, 2007) . In the report by Navalpakkam and colleagues, for instance, the prevalence effect was only eliminated in extreme conditions in which there was a huge discrepancy between gain and penalty for correct and incorrect responses and the observers were competing against each other for a prize. Wolfe and colleagues (2007) also reported that, except for the technique of inserting sudden bursts of high-prevalence trials into a block, the various means of reducing miss rates in low-prevalence blocks seem to be futile. Our results support the view that the prevalence effect is very robust by showing that it is exclusively the consequence of bottom-up experience and is not affected by top-down control. What makes this result particularly interesting is that the observers took longer to respond ''No" when they were given cues suggesting a higher probability of target presence. In other words, they did indeed actively follow the instructions. Nevertheless, their efforts did not help to ''cure" the prevalence effect. This gives strong support to the view that the prevalence effect is very stubborn and, even with reasonable motivation and effort, cannot be overriden.
The present study also has important practical implications. We want to reduce the error rates in real-life low-prevalence situations, such as airport baggage screening or X-ray examination in medical settings. Naturally, one may hope to do so by giving the workers stricter instructions. The present study suggests that such a method is probably futile. The only effective method is to randomly distribute some ''pseudo-targets" into the screening, thereby ensuring that, by gaining experience with such targets, workers will not miss real targets when they show up. . In both Experiments 3 and 4, in constant blocks, the miss rates in the ''high-prevalence" condition were significantly lower than those in the ''low-prevalence" condition, whereas in mixed blocks, the miss rates in the ''high-prevalence" and ''low-prevalence" conditions were about the same. See text for details.
